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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of implementing a market to ration a given quantity of resources is by no means novel. Working examples include markets for taxi medallions and liquor licenses. Suggested applications for the use of a market approach abound in the economics literature, especially in the fields of air and water pollution.' Why has the idea of setting up a market in transferable property rights received so much attention? One key reason, and the reason which motivates this paper, is that such markets have the potential to achieve a given objective in a cost-effective manner. Whether this potential is realized depends, among other things, on the design of the market and the extent to which individual firms can exert a significant influence on the market.
The purpose of this paper will be to explore how the initial distribution of property rights can lead to inefficiencies. Section II develops the basic model for the case in which one firm can influence the market. Section III considers a potential application of the model. The results of the theoretical analysis are then 754 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS compared with the conventional wisdom, and directions for future research are discussed in Section IV.
For analytical purposes, firms are divided into two categories. A firm will be said to have market power if it realizes it has an influence on price. A firm will not have market power if it acts as a price taker. The question for analysis, then, is how a single firm with market power might influence the market by affecting the price at which a commodity sells. More precisely, this essay examines how the price strategy of a firm with market power varies with changes in the initial distribution of property rights.
In the static models developed below, all transactions take place at a single price. Restricting the model in this way permits analysis of a range of inefficient outcomes. This is in contrast to the approach taken by Coase [1960] in his seminal article, who does not restrict the bargaining space and, consequently, emphasizes the range of efficient outcomes that can result, irrespective of the initial endowment of property rights.
The principal result is that the degree of inefficiency observed in the market is systematically related to the distribution of permits. For the case of one firm with market power, the results have some intuitive appeal. If a firm with market power would elect to buy permits in a competitive market (i.e., where all firms act as if they were price takers), then it follows a strategy resembling that of a monopsonist. If it would choose to sell permits in a competitive market, then the firm with market power follows a strategy resembling that of a monopolist. These results are formalized in the next section.
II. THE BASIC MODEL
A critical assumption underlying the competitive model is that firms act as if they were price takers. In the model developed below, it will be assumed that all firms except one are price takers. The basic question to be answered is how (and whether) the equilibrium price and quantities will vary as a function of the initial distribution of permits among firms.
Consider the case of m firms with firm 1 designated as the firm with market power. A total of L permits are distributed to the firms, with the ith firm receiving Q? permits. Firms are allowed to trade permits in a market that lasts for one period. The number of permits that the ith firm has after trading will be Equation (4) reveals that the only case in which the marginal cost of abatement -C1 will equal the equilibrium price is when firm l's distribution of permits just equals the amount it chooses to use. In effect, this says that the only way to achieve a costeffective solution, where marginal abatement costs are equal for all firms, is to pick an initial distribution of permits for firm 1 which coincides with the cost-minimizing solution. This gives rise to the following result: PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that there is one firm with market power. If it does not receive an amount of permits equal to the number that it holds in equilibrium, then the total expenditure on abatement will exceed the cost-minimizing solution.
The key point to be gleaned from the analysis is that the distribution of permits matters, with regard not only to equity considerations but also to cost. Traditional models of such markets view problems of permit distribution as being strictly an equity issue.3 With the introduction of market power, it was shown that the distribution of permits may also impinge on efficiency considerations. The next logical question to explore is how the market equilibrium will vary as a function of firm l's initial distribution of permits. Doing the necessary comparative statics yields
3. The analysis by Montgomery [1972] is one such example. In this analysis firms are assumed to be price takers. For the case of one pollutant, one market, and a linear relationship between source emissions and environmental quality, Montgomery finds that the distribution of permits will have no effect on achieving the target in a cost-effective manner.
The expression for the denominator is the second-order condition for the cost minimization and will be positive if the second-order sufficiency condition for a minimum obtains. For example, in the case of linear demand curves (i.e., Q. = 0), the expression will be positive. Thus, for the case when a regular interior minimum exists, a transfer of permits from any of the price takers to the firm with market power will result in an increase in the equilibrium price. An immediate corollary to this result is that the number of permits that the firm with market power uses will increase as its initial allocation of permits is increased. Formally, the problem is to show (aQ1/Q?) > 0. By the chain rule, The expression on the right-hand side of (7) equals -1'7' 2Q(P), which is positive, because demand curves are presumed to be negatively sloped.
One question that arises in this model is whether there is any systematic relationship between the distribution of permits to the firm with market power and the degree of inefficiency. If inefficiency is measured by the extent to which abatement costs exceed the minimum required to reach a stated target, then it is possible to show the following result: Combining (13) with equation (4) yields the result that total cost achieves a minimum at Q* and will increase as the permit distribution deviates from Q* in either direction.
III. A POTENTIAL APPLICATION
In order to apply the basic model described in the previous section, it is necessary to develop an operational test for identifying a firm with market power. How this might be done is beyond the scope of this paper. In the application discussed below, the firm holding the largest share of permits under a competitive market simulation is designated as the market power firm.
To demonstrate how the basic model can be applied, the problem of controlling particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region was selected. This problem was chosen because it appeared to be a likely candidate for a transferable property rights scheme, and because the problem of market power could conceivably arise. Market simulations based on the assumption that firms are price takers indicate that the largest emitter of sulfur oxides, an electric utility, could account for as much as half of the total emissions, and an even higher proportion of emissions for which abatement technologies are known-i.e., controllable emissions.4
The extent of market power will in general, vary with the level of allowable emissions, the shape of the marginal abatement cost schedule for the market power firm, and the marginal abatement costs faced by all other firms. For this particular example, a permit will be defined as the right to emit one ton of sulfur oxides emissions per day for one day. Based on this definition, Figure I shows the marginal costs of abatement for the firm designated as the market power firm.5 Two curves are drawn in Figure I Given permit use as a function of the initial distribution of permits, it is then possible to estimate the total annual costs of abatement by integrating equations (14) and (15). The relationship between total annual abatement expenditures and the initial distribution of permits is shown in Figure IV . Note that abatement expenditures remain relatively constant (in the neighborhood of 490 million dollars annually) until the market power firm is able to exert some monopoly power when it receives permits in excess of 60 tons per day.
The relative importance of monopolistic and monopsonistic behavior may be quite sensitive to parameter changes. In this case, monopsonistic behavior does not appear to present a problem. The reason is that in the range of the competitive equilibrium for emissions limits around this stringent standard, the supply of permits from other firms to the largest source is very sensitive to price changes. This undermines the opportunity of the firm with market power to take advantage of its high market share. As the emissions ceiling is relaxed, inefficiencies resulting from monopsonistic behavior tend to increase.
If the primary objective in setting up a market is to minimize total abatement costs, Figure IV indicates that the policymaker should try to avoid a situation where the firm with market power can act as a monopolist. However, because of the uncertainty associated with the cost data, it makes sense to try to minimize the likelihood that a firm or group of firms will be able to induce a price-quantity equilibrium which departs from the competitive result in either direction. Alternatives for dealing with this issue are discussed in Hahn and Noll [1982] . The theory developed in this paper indicates that the expected excess demand of each firm may be a critical variable over which the policymaker can exercise control.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored the issue of market power in the context of markets in transferable property rights. The simple model developed in Section II reveals two essential points. First, just because a firm may have a large share of the permits, this does not necessarily mean it can influence the outcome in the permit market. Second, if a firm does have market power in the permit market, its effect on price (assuming that there is one firm with market power) varies with its excess demand for permits. That is to say, once the potential for market power has been ascertained, it is a flow-excess demand of the firm with market power-which determines the equilibrium.
The importance of the flow has immediate implications for market design. In particular, with full knowledge of demand functions, a central authority could effectively pick the quantity of permits it wanted the market power firm to use through a suitable initial allocation. The limits to the discretion of the authority would be dictated by two extreme cases: pure monopsony in which all permits are distributed to the price takers, and pure monopoly in which all permits are distributed to the firm with market power.
Of course, the more realistic situation is one in which the authority has, at most, only a crude estimate of the demand functions. In this case, the basic model can be applied to assess the possibilities for exerting market influence. The sensitivity of the results could be checked by varying the demand functions and the initial distribution of permits. This would allow the policymaker to determine whether the type of market influence considered here is likely to pose a problem in a given application. The key result obtained here, that it is the pattern of excess demands that ultimately determines the extent to which any firm can influence the market, does not appear to be widely recognized. One reason is that many people feel that manipulation of such markets will not be a problem. For example, Tietenberg, in surveying the literature on air rights markets, expresses the view that "the anticompetitive effects of a TDP (transferable discharge permit) system are not likely to be very important in general" [1980, p. 414]. For several applications such as the one considered by DeLucia [1974] and the one considered by Hahn [1981a] , the assumption that the market will approximate the competitive solution would appear to depend critically on how the institutions are designed. Because there is a very real possibility that several markets in transferable property rights could be subject to different kinds of systematic manipulation, there is a need to explore further the ramifications of such problems in theory and applications.
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